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2About this text1:
This text is inspired from a \Cours Bachelier" held in January 2009 and taught
by Jean-Michel Lasry. This course was based upon the articles of the three au-
thors and upon unpublished materials developed by the authors. Proofs were not
presented during the conferences and are now available. So are some issues that
were only rapidly tackled during class.
The content of this text is therefore far more important than the actual \Cours
Bachelier" conferences, though the guiding principle is the same and consists in
a progressive introduction of the concepts, methodologies and mathematical tools
of mean eld games theory.
Mean eld games theory was created in 2006 by Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-
Louis Lions and the rst results and developments are given in the publications
[34, 35, 36]: structures, concepts, denitions of equilibria, forward-backward
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman/Kolmogorov equation systems, existence theorems in
static and dynamic cases, links with Nash equilibria and dynamics in n-player
games theory when n tends to innity, variational principle for decentralization,
etc. A number of developments were then implemented by Jean-Michel Lasry
and Pierre-Louis Lions, several of them in collaboration with Olivier Gu eant:
notions of stability of solutions, specic numerical methods, numerical educ-
tive algorithms, and developments in 1/n for a better approximation to n-player
games. These developments were presented in three successive courses at the
Coll ege de France [38], in a Bachelier course, in various publications [23, 24]
and in Olivier Gu eant's PhD thesis [23]. Various applications, notably on the
economics of scarce resources, were implemented or are ongoing (in collabo-
ration: Pierre No el Giraud, Olivier Gu eant, Jean-Michel Lasry, Pierre-Louis
Lions). Advances in population dynamics were made by Olivier Gu eant [23].
Since 2008, several other authors have made further contributions, or are work-
ing on new applications and/or properties of MFG models [33, 21].
1 Introduction to mean eld games
Mean eld games theory is a branch of game theory. It is therefore a set of con-
cepts, mathematical tools, theorems, simulation methods and algorithms, which
like all game theory is intended to help specialists model situations of agents
who take decisions in a context of strategic interactions. These specialists, as
in other areas of game theory, will probably be economists, micro- or macro-
economists and, given the specicities of mean eld games theory, possibly also
sociologists, engineers and even architects or urban planners. In any case, this
1The research results presented in this text could not have been made without the nancial
support of the Chair \Finance and Sustainable Development". Hence, the authors express
their gratitude to the Chair and all the associated partners.
Also, the \Conseil Fran cais de l'Energie" deserves a special acknowledgment for its specic
nancial support on the mean eld games application to exhaustible resources.
3view of the eld of application emerges, we feel, from the panorama created by
the rst \toy models" presented in this text.
We choose the term \toy models" to indicate the particular status of game the-
ory and of many \examples" of it. Consider the famous \prisoner's dilemma".
Nobody thinks of taking the story literally, nor that this example was created
to be applied to the real-life situations it is supposed to evoke. In fact it is a
fable intended to introduce an archetype of strategic interaction: an archetype
that can thus be recognized in many negotiation situations in business life and
elsewhere. Many of our examples have a similar status. \What time does the
meeting start?" or the \Mexican wave equation" should not be taken literally,
as a desire to scientically model these situations in social life. Even if there is
clearly an element of truth in our models for these two examples, we believe that
the interest for the reader is primarily in the structure that is indicated through
these \toy models". The Mexican wave equation, for example, shows how a
sophisticated propagation phenomenon in social space can be constructed from
non-cooperative individual behaviors in a rational expectation context, once a
certain taste for imitation is present in agents' utility function.
Introducing mean eld games through these \toy models" is also a way of lead-
ing the reader to progressively discover the concepts and the mathematics of
mean eld games theory.
In this text we present a large amount of results and mathematical proofs. Nev-
ertheless we cover only some parts of the large mathematical corpus built up
since 2006. Thus for mathematicians this course can be seen as an introduction,
or a reading in parallel with mean eld games mathematical papers and with
the three dierent courses held by Pierre-Louis Lions at the Coll ege de France
(06-07, 07-08, 08-09), which present the whole mathematical corpus and which
can be downloaded from the Coll ege de France website [38].
1.1 Three routes
There are three routes leading naturally to mean eld games theory. Each
route casts light on a particular aspect of mean eld games theory, and the
three complement each other.
1.1.1 First route: from physics to mean eld games
The rst route takes its departure from particle physics2. In particle physics,
mean eld theory designates a highly eective methodology for handling a wide
2Several articles were written using the mean eld notion of physicists and applying it to
economic dynamics. One may see [15], [16] or [27] as instances of such an approach. Our
approach is dierent from the approach of the \econophysicists" since we are more inu-
enced by control theory and hence more keen on mixing optimization and mean elds. As a
consequence, the forward/backward structure of our approach is not present in most of the
preceding works.
4variety of situations in which there are too many particles to permit the dynam-
ics or equilibrium to be described by modeling all the inter-particle interactions.
The enormous number of all these interactions makes a detailed model ineec-
tive: unreadable and unsuitable for both calculation and simulation, the model
becomes, in a word, unusable.
Nevertheless, in many situations of this kind, it is possible to construct an ex-
cellent approximation to the situation by introducing one or more \mean elds"
that serve as mediators for describing inter-particle interactions. In this kind of
model, one describes the contribution of each particle to the creation of a mean
eld, and the eect of the mean eld on each particle, by conceiving each par-
ticle as innitesimal, i.e. by carrying out a kind of limit process on the number
n of particles (n ! 1).
A large proportion of types of inter-particle interactions, though not all, lend
themselves to this methodology: the inter-particle interactions must be su-
ciently \weak" or \regular" in order for the statistical phenomena to emerge.
Mean eld games theory provides an adaptation of this methodology to cases
in which the particles are replaced by agents who mutually interact in socioe-
conomic and/or strategic situations. The main dierence, indeed the challenge,
is to take account not only of the ability of agents to take decisions, but espe-
cially the capacity for strategic interaction, i.e. the capacity of each agent to
construct strategies that involve thinking about his peers, who in turn and at
the same time elaborate their own individual strategies.
This new sophistication changes the nature of the mean eld: it is no longer a
statistic on the domain of particle states, but rather a statistic on the domain
of agent states and hence on the domain of strategies and information.
This rst route is certainly the one that sheds most light on the operating char-
acteristics of mean eld games theory: since the methodology of mean elds
works very well in particle physics and provides tractable models in a priori
complex situations, it oers good prospects for transposition to the world of
agents.
But this route is also the most demanding, and would probably be the most
discouraging on any initial attempt. Mean eld games theory has been able to
emerge only because N-player game theory has long existed, thanks to the re-
markable pioneering work carried out by Von Neumann and Morgenstern ([47])
sixty years ago and to the important developments made since then, notably
by Nash ([44, 43, 45, 46]) and then Aumann ([9]), and through the many ap-
plications that have been developed, particularly in most branches of economics.
What we want to provide is indeed a new branch of game theory for large games
that relies on Nash equilibria and on the various concepts introduced in this
5eld during the last 50 years. We are not applying, mutatis mutandis, the tools
of statistical physics to economic problems. This is an important dierence
between mean eld games and econophysics and we need to insist on that.
Econophysicists only apply theories and methods originally rooted in physics
to describe an economy and, although they often manage to have good models
for the topics under scrutiny, these models are only descriptive. For instance,
econophysicists manage to have good descriptive models for wealth distributions
using only kinetic models and microscopic interactions (see [14]) but they never
explain why people may want to exchange money as in their models (our last
model can be seen as an attempt to model wealth distributions in a dierent
way). Mean eld games theory proposes to use the tools of physics but to
use them inside the classical economic axiomatic, to explain (and not only to
describe) phenomenon. Hence we will assign rationality to agents and not regard
them as just gas particles, and not even as robots applying some predetermined
behavioral strategy: strategic choices are endogenous in our models as they are
in game theory.
1.1.2 Second route: from game theory to mean eld games
This route is the most well-charted from a mathematical standpoint: it involves
studying the limit of a large class of N-player games when N tends to innity.
Usually, dierential games with N-players can be summed up by an HJB-Isaacs
system of PDEs that turns out to be untractable. Fortunately things are sim-
plied, at least for a wide range of games that are symmetrical as far as players
are concerned, as the number of players increases, and for deep reasons. Indeed,
interindividual complex strategies can no longer be implemented by the players,
for each player is progressively lost in the crowd in the eyes of other players
when the number of players increases.
More precisely, the class that proves to be best suited to this passage to the
limit is that of games in which players of the same kind can be interchanged
without altering the game: a form of anonymity of contexts where nothing is
dependent on the individual. This hypothesis is particularly appropriate in the
modeling of applications when there are a large number of players. From a
mathematical standpoint this hypothesis of invariance through permutation is
crucial in moving to the limit.
Moving to the limit causes a situation to emerge in which each player has be-
come innitesimal amidst the mass of other players, and constructs his strategies
from his own state and from the state of the innite mass of his co-players, who
in turn simultaneously construct their strategies in the same way. It is this
equilibrium of each player in the mass of co-players that we term the mean eld
approach.
Continuums of players are not new in the literature and they have been widely
used since Robert Aumann and his seminal paper on general equilibrium with
6innitely many players (see [9]). However, our approach is dierent in many
ways from what has been studied by now (see the literature on large games for
instance - [32, 29, 30, 31]). An example is the set of specic partial dierential
equations systems developed and studied in the seminal articles [34, 35, 36] and
in [38]. Another instance is the approximation of a N-player game by a mean
eld game and the study on the error term in 1
N (see our rst toy model). This
strategy of approximation allows us to constrain the strategies of the players
(since no complex strategies involving specic players can be played) and hence
to reduce the nite dimension of the game to a granularity eect that leads to
a common noise for the group of players.
1.1.3 Third route: from economics to mean eld games
In the theory of general economic equilibrium, agents have little concerned about
each others: everyone looks only to his own interest and to market prices. The
only level at which the existence of others applies is found in the hypothesis
of rational expectations. A theory is viewed as credible from the standpoint of
rational expectations only if each agent can check whether by putting himself
in the place of others he would nd the behavior predicted by the theory. This
is the only requirement that removes the agent of general equilibrium from his
solipsism. In other words, in the theory of general equilibrium, prices mediate
all social interactions. Yet we know that in many cases there are other economic
eects which give rise to other interactions between agents: externality, public
goods, etc. The incorporation of these eects when they are of a statistical
nature, which is most often the case, leads to a \mean eld"-type denition (in
the sense given above) of equilibrium between agents. Similarly, the issues of in-
dustrial economics in which agents are involved in complex systems of signaling,
entry barriers, positioning in relation to the competition, etc. can become mean
eld games equilibria when the size of the groups of agents concerned grows.
These interactions between agents are the main interests of economists. They
want to understand how prices form through rational behaviors and the conse-
quence of externality eects. Also, economists are interested in the evolution
of an economy and hence they have been spending a lot of time on anticipa-
tions and the way prices or, more generally, behaviors form in an intertemporal
context. This eld of economics is clearly untractable for econophysicists since
econophysics only considers forward problems without anticipations except per-
haps from a heuristical point of view that makes the backward dimension van-
ish. That's another dierence between mean eld games theory and the mean
elds of econophysicists: mean eld games have a forward/backward structure.
In most mean eld games models, we try not only to describe but also, and
most importantly, to explain a phenomenon using the economic toolbox of util-
ity maximization and rational expectations. Hence mean eld games theory
appears as a toolbox to be used by economists and not as a new competing
paradigm in social sciences that avoid considering the major methodological
advances made by economists in the last decades.
71.2 Fields of application
1.2.1 Mean eld games versus N-player modeling
These three routes place the representation of agents in mean eld games the-
ory. They are more sophisticated than the agents of general equilibrium in
economics, who as we have seen are largely indierent to their co-agents and
are concerned only with prices. Conversely, the agents of mean eld games the-
ory are less sophisticated than the players of N-player game theory since they
base their strategies only on the statistical state of the mass of co-agents.
Nevertheless, this lesser sophistication of the mean eld games agent compared
to the N-player game theory player produces by way of compensation a wide
variety of positive eects in two very dierent respects: in terms of eciency on
the one hand and of widening the eld of application on the other.
As far as eciency is concerned
A large part of this eciency and readability comes from the possibility of de-
ploying the power of dierential calculus. This advantage is, moreover, one of
the dierences between mean eld games and other prior developments already
mentioned in games with an innite number of players. These works, which
follow on from Robert Aumann's outstanding contribution, basically use mea-
sure theories, as we do, to represent the continuum of players, but they only
use measure theory. From a mathematical standpoint, mean eld games the-
ory takes a completely new direction by opening the door to extensive use of
dierential calculus. Dierential calculus has been one of the most powerful
and productive tools for some 300 years and major advances have been done in
the last decades in many applied elds outside physics: applications of partial
dierential equations (PDE) to control problems, It^ o or Malliavin stochastic cal-
culus, SPDE, and advanced methods of functional analysis. Mean eld games
theory has moreover enabled a new and autonomous corpus to be developed
in this mathematical eld, including at the junction of dierential calculus and
measure theory, in the form of sophisticated developments in the geometry of
Wasserstein spaces.
An enlargement of the eld of application: two examples
i) A substantial gain in relation to N-player game theory derives from the
ease with which questions of player entries and exits can be dealt with.
Indeed, through the representation of players by a continuum, the mod-
eling of the renewal of player generations is no longer a problem. Like
8time and player distribution in space, states are continuous variables, and
entries and exits are simple ows whose technical treatment presents no
special problems. One can thus implement overlapping generation models
without pain.
ii) The emergence of a social dimension in mean eld games models, since,
in these models, statistical data on other players emerge as fundamental
constituents of individual strategies. From this point of view, the approx-
imation of N-player games by the mean eld games limit with, if need be,
the use of the corrective term in 1=N, allows this approach to introduce a
\social" dimension in regard to players, even in limited groups of, say, a
few hundred agents.
In view of the positive eects compared with N-player games, it seems quite
natural to us to consider mean eld games \solutions" to problems of N-player
games. Consider, for example, an N-player game where N is fairly small, in
the order of a few dozen, and with player entries and exits. It is very likely
that in a large number of cases the mean eld games limit (N ! 1) provides a
good rst approximation to the N-player solution and that the rst term of the
development in 1=N is sucient to described with enough precision the eects
due to granularity (produced by the fact that N is nite and rather small).
Thus there is a wide eld of application for mean eld games models. It ranges
from general equilibrium with externality to the Mexican wave, and its center
of gravity seems to us, from today's standpoint, to be socioeconomic modeling
in a rational expectations context.
1.2.2 A large family of examples
To illustrate the dierent aspects of mean eld games theory, and to indicate
something of its domains of application, we shall in the follow-up to this course
present a series of \toy models". In other words, as we mentioned above, we
generally present extremely stylized models, which are not to be taken literally
and require being reworked by specialists, but which show the possible archi-
tecture of applications to various questions:
 Eects of coordination and interactions in the face of externality (meeting
time)
 Production of a limited resource (peak oil, Hotelling's rule)
 Mimicry and propagation of behaviors in the social area (Mexican wave,
forenames, fashion, etc.)
 Agoraphobia/agoraphilia, search for identity, etc. (quadratic-Gaussian
population models)
9 Distortion of nancial management in the presence of a signaling problem
(managers and ranking)
 Eects of competition on the dynamics of human capital (Pareto-type
distribution of salaries: an example of the positive eect of negative ex-
ternality).
In the course of presenting these \toy models", the mathematical concepts and
methods, indeed the whole mean eld games toolbox, will become progressively
apparent. The considerations mentioned above will thus acquire substance.
1.3 The mathematical tools of the mean eld approach
The implementation of the mean eld games theory as a modeling methodology
led to writing new types of systems of equations, then developing the mathemat-
ical apparatus required for handling these equations: theorems for the existence
of solutions, numerical calculation algorithms, specic denition of stability,
variational principles, etc.
We shall return in the conclusion of this course to the mathematical corpus
which the reader will be able to discover through these examples.
2 A rst toy model: What time does the meet-
ing start?
We begin with a \toy model" constructed as a series of episodes, or rather as the
old TV show \Double your Money", in which the dramatic tension progressively
grows. We shall here adopt the serious true/false-type question: \What time
does the meeting start?".
We recall what was previously said in the introduction on the role of \toy mod-
els", of which the prisoner's dilemma is typical. Nevertheless, we shall proceed
as if it involved a scientic investigation of the subject, by tackling it in an
increasingly sophisticated step-by-step manner. We therefore begin with a rel-
atively simple framework, then we progressively add various diculties to give
the model greater depth and at the same time reveal the technological answers
provided by the mean eld games approach. As this \toy model" is presented,
we hope the readers will think that it applies to real examples they are particu-
larly familiar with. In the next section, we shall oer a stylized modeling of oil
production over a long period of time that will show how our \toy model" can
shed light on more serious contexts.
102.1 An initial simple model
2.1.1 Introduction
A meeting scheduled for a certain time t very often only starts several minutes
after the scheduled time. The actual time T when the meeting starts depends
on the dynamics of the arrival of its participants. If a rule sets the start of the
meeting at the point when a certain quorum is reached, this rule sets up a form
of strategic interaction between agents. We shall construct a rst mean eld
games approach to this situation.
We consider a meeting with a very large number of participants and we agree
to consider them as a continuum of agents (the justication will be provided
further on). Our agents are rational and understand the situation. More pre-
cisely, all the data that we shall provide pertaining to the problem is common
knowledge to the meeting participants.
Three times will be important in this model:
 t the scheduled time of the meeting.
 i the time at which agent i would like to arrive in view of the problem.
In reality, we suppose that he will arrive at time ~ i = i +i~ i where ~ i is
a normal noise with variance 1, specic to agent i (hypothesis of idiosyn-
cratic noise3). More precisely, i is a variable controlled by the agent i
and i~ i is an uncertainty the agent is subject to. These uncertainties and
their intensity dier in the population of agents since some agents come a
long way to participate in the meeting and others are very close. We will
note m0 the distribution of i in the population.
 T the actual time the meeting will start (the rule which sets the meeting
starting time T according to the arrival of participants is given further
on).
To decide on his arrival time, or at least his intended arrival time i, each agent
will optimize a total cost that, to simplify things (since it is \toy model"), we
assume is made of three components:
 A cost (reputation eect) of lateness in relation to the scheduled time t:
c1(t;T; ~ ) = [~    t]+
 A cost (personal inconvenience) of lateness in relation to the actual start-
ing time of the meeting T:
c2(t;T; ~ ) = [~    T]+
3This hypothesis of independence will simplify the equations to determine the equilibrium
11 A waiting time cost that corresponds to the time lost waiting to reach
time T :
c3(t;T; ~ ) = [T   ~ ]+
Let us note c(t;T; ~ ) the sum of these three costs which is a convex function of ~ .
We can already make the model more complex by assuming dierent functions
for c1, c2, c3 according to the agent, but our goal is precisely the opposite: to
make it simple in order to explain the methodology.
2.1.2 Resolution
The optimization problem that each agent faces is therefore to minimize his
expected total cost. Nash-MFG equilibrium, with rational expectations, pre-
supposes that each agent optimizes by assuming T to be known. T is a priori
a random variable but because we consider an innite number of players, the
\law of large numbers" will imply that T is deterministic and we consider a
deterministic T from now4.
For agent i the problem is therefore:




; ~ i = i + i~ i
Here T is the mean eld, the exhaustive summary for each agent of the behavior
of the others.
The exercise is to show the existence of a xed point T, i.e. to show that individ-
ual optimization behaviors, supposing T is known, fully generate the realization
of this time T.
To show that this equilibrium exists, one must rst examine more closely agents'
individual choices, which is done simply by obtaining a rst-order condition.













where N is the cumulative distribution function associated to a normal distri-
bution.
Proof:
The expression to minimize is:
E

[~ i   t]+ + [~ i   T]+ + [T   ~ i]+

4Hence rational expectations are simply perfect expectations.
12= E

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(i   T)
The rst order condition of the problem is therefore given by:
P
 
i   t + i~ i > 0

+ ( + )P
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Since N is a strictly monotonic cumulative distribution function and since the
3 parameters ,  and  are positive, the existence and uniqueness of i can be
deduced easily.
From this characterization of i as a function of (t;T;i) we can deduce the
dynamics of agents' arrival. For this let us consider rst of all the distribution
m0 of the i within the continuum. Because of the continuum and the law of
large numbers, this distribution is transported by the application i 7! ~ i.
If we therefore note F the (deterministic !) cumulative distribution function of
the agents' real arrival times, it is natural to establish a rule on the real starting
time T from the meeting, which depends on the function F(). An example is
that of a quorum: the meeting starts after the scheduled time and only when a
proportion  of the participants have arrived.
We then have to prove the existence and uniqueness of a xed point. Starting
from a value T, we obtain agents' optimal strategies (i(;T))i. These optimal
strategies are the targeted times but each person's arrival time is aected by a
noise: we obtain the real arrival times (~ i(;T))i. Then from the law of large
numbers and the hypothesis of the independence of agents' uncertainties, these
arrival times are distributed according to F, which is deterministic, and T is
deduced from F by the meeting starting time rule (T(F)), in this case the
quorum. This is straightforwardly summarized by the following scheme:
T : T 7! (i(;T))i 7! (~ i(;T))i 7! F = F(;T) 7! T(F)
The result we obtain is as follows:
Proposition 2.2 (Equilibrium T). If  > 0; > 0; > 0 and if 0 = 2 supp(m0)
then T is a contraction mapping of [t;+1[, and there is a unique solution T
to our problem.




















13Since 0 is supposed not to be in the support of m0, this leads to d
dT (t;;T) 
k < 1.
Hence, 8T;s;h > 0,
F(s;T+h) = P(i(i;T+h)+ii  s)  P(i(i;T)+kh+ii  s) = F(s kh;T)
Consequently,
T(F(;T + h))  T(F(   kh;T))  T(F(;T)) + kh
) T(T + h)   T(T)  kh
and this proves the result through the contraction mapping theorem.
It is interesting to notice that the quorum case is not special in the sense that
the preceding proof only requires the T setting rule (T : F() 7! T) to verify
the following properties for the above result to be true.
 8F();T(F())  t: the meeting never starts before t
 (Monotony) Let's consider two cumulative distribution functions F()
and G().
If F()  G() then T(F())  T(G())
 (Sub-additivity) 8s > 0;T(F(   s))   T(F())  s
In the more general case where the cost depends on F, strategic interaction no
longer simply reduces to time T. It is very natural that the social cost for each
agent depends on the proportion of participants who are already there when he
arrives. In this more general case, F is the mean eld: each person makes his
decision according to F. In return, the decisions construct F. From a mathe-
matical standpoint, the xed point concerns F.
2.2 Variants
There are many possible ways of enriching this initial \toy model". For ex-
ample, one variant involves considering a shared disturbance in addition to the
idiosyncratic disturbances. This is an important variant as it is an example
where the dynamics of the population is stochastic. Nonetheless, as it would
lead us to too long developments we will not consider this variant here.
The variant we shall present is a \geographical" model, i.e. the agents are
initially distributed in dierent places and must come to where the meeting is
being held.
The interest of this variant is that it will show how coupled forward/backward
PDEs, which are the core of mean eld game theory (in continuous time, with
a continuous state space), emerge.
142.2.1 The framework
Thus let us suppose that the agents are distributed on the negative half-line
according to distribution function m0() (with compact support and such that
m0(0) = 0) and that they must go to the meeting held at 0. Suppose that in




where drift a is controlled in return for a quadratic cost 1
2a2 (here  is the same
for everyone). This distribution hypothesis may seem to be a rather articial
representation in this example of transport uncertainties. In practice, we shall
see that it is relatively pertinent in other applications.














0 = x0; dXi
t = ai
tdt + dW i
t and the time to reach 0 is given by
~ i = minfs=Xi
s = 0g.
If one looks for a Nash-MFG equilibrium, one will reason at a given T and
each agent's problem is one of stochastic control. We thus have the following
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation5:






















The condition at the limit is simply 8;u(;0) = c(t;T;), where T is deter-
ministic for the same reason as before. This condition corresponds to the total
cost on arrival at the meeting (we will assume that c has the same shape as
in the preceding setup but we impose c not to be piecewise-linear but twice
continuously dierentiable).
The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation gives a Bellman function u and hence
indicates the optimal behavior of agents for a xed T. This equation is the
same for all agents since they have the same cost criterion and dier only in
their point of departure at the initial moment. Moreover, the solution here is
5As it is often the case in this text, we will consider that the solution of the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation is a solution of the optimization problem. In general, if we do not
provide any verication result for the solutions of the mean eld games partial dierential
equations, it should be noticed that verifying (u;m) indeed provides a solution of the opti-
mization problem is like verifying u, solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with
m xed, provides a solution of the optimization problem with m xed. Hence, there should
not be specic tools of verication for mean eld games.
15Markovian as in most stochastic optimization problems and the strategy, i.e.
the optimal drift a(s;x) =  @xu(s;x) therefore depends only on the place x
and the time s. Thus, in particular, it does not depend on the agent concerned:
the agents, whom unknown factors lead to the same point x at time s, adopt
the same strategy, which is natural, since they have the same information, same
transport costs and same nal criterion. This property simplies the expression
of the problem.
The \law of large numbers" then gives us the distribution m of agents through
the Kolmogorov equation6. This distribution corresponds to the distribution of
players who have not yet arrived at 0 and therefore m loses mass (through 0),
as agents gradually arrive at the meeting. The dynamics of m is:





m(0;) = m0() is obviously xed, and we will try to nd a solution with the
following \smooth t" condition: m(;0) = 0.
Moreover, as we have chosen to model the problem by the dynamics of Brownian
diusion, the model must be complemented and restricted to a compact domain.
In the proof that follows, we suppose that the domain is [0;Tmax][ Xmax;0]
and the boundary conditions are
u(Tmax;) = c(t;T;Tmax); u(; Xmax) = c(t;T;Tmax); m(; Xmax) = 0
In this context, the ow reaching 0 (when the agents reach the meeting place) is






Now, T is xed by the quorum rule (with let's say  = 90%) but we impose that





t; if F 1()  t
Tmax; if F(Tmax)  
F 1(); otherwise
2.2.2 Existence of an equilibrium for the meeting starting time
As in the rst simple case, we need to prove that there is a time T coherent
with the (rational) expectations of the agents. We are going to use a xed point
6Note that this is based not only on the independence hypothesis of noises but also on
the simple structure of noises. For example, if volatility depends on state, the associated
elliptic operator would replace the Laplace operator. Also, If noises were not independent,
the deterministic partial dierential equation would have to be replaced by a stochastic one.
For all these developments, we refer to [38]
16theorem as before. Indeed, one goes from a given T and deduces u. The Kol-
mogorov equation then gives us m and therefore the arrival ow at 0. Since the
time T in our example is given by the arrival of a proportion  of all the agents,
it clearly is a matter of xed point.
Before going deeply in the mathematics, let's introduce some hypotheses:
 We suppose that T 7! c(t;T;) is a continuous function
 We suppose that  7! c(t;T;) is a C2 function.
 We suppose that m0(0) = m0( Xmax) = 0. Also, we suppose that
jm0
0(0)j > 0 and jm0
0( Xmax)j > 0
Now, we consider the following scheme (the functional spaces involved in the
scheme will be proved to be the right ones in what follows):
T 7! c(t;T;) 2 C2 7! u 2 C2 7! @xu 2 C1 7! m 2 C1 7!  @xm(;0) 2 C0(7! F) 7! T
Since the scheme is from [t;Tmax] to [t;Tmax], to obtain a xed point result, we
just need to prove that the scheme is continuous.
The rst part of the scheme (T 7! c(t;T;) 2 C2) is continuous and well dened
by hypothesis. For the second part of the scheme (c(t;T;) 2 C2 7! u 2 C2),
we just state a lemma:









with the boundary conditions
u(;0) = c(t;T;) u(Tmax;) = c(t;Tmax;Tmax); u(; Xmax) = c(t;Tmax;Tmax)
The solution u is in C2(]0;Tmax[]   Xmax;0[) and 9K;8T 2 [t;Tmax];@xu is
a K-Lipschitz function.
Moreover the mapping c(t;T;) 2 C2 7! u 2 C2 is continuous.
Now that we get u and then the control  @xu we can turn to the Kolmogorov
equation. We state a lemma that is an application of Hopf's principle.
Lemma 2.4. Let's consider the following PDE:





with a 2 C1 (and hence Lipschitz) and the boundary conditions m(0;) =
m0(); m(;0) = 0; m(; Xmax) = 0 where m0 is supposed to verify the
17above hypotheses.
Then the solution m is in C1((0;Tmax)  ( Xmax;0)) and
9 > 0;inf j@xm(;0)j  
Moreover  only depends on the Lipschitz constant of the function a.
Also the mapping a 7! m 2 C1 is continuous.
From these two lemmas, we can deduce a third one adapted to our problem.
Indeed, since u is a C2 function, a =  @xu is a Lipschitz function and hence we
have a lower bound to the ow arriving at the meeting:
Lemma 2.5.
9 > 0;8T 2 [t;Tmax];inf j@xm(;0)j  
Now, let's consider the mapping 	 :  @xm(;0) 2 C0 7! T, dened above using
(here) the quorum rule. We are going to prove that 	 is continuous as soon as
 @xm(;0) has a strictly positive lower bound.
Lemma 2.6. 	 is a Lipschitz function on C0([0;Tmax];R
+).
Proof:
Let's consider two functions  1 and  2 that stand for two possible ows of
arrival and let's dene  a common lower bound to these two functions. Then,
let's dene T1 = 	( 1) and T2 = 	( 2). If T1 and T2 are both in ]t;Tmax[,




















( 1    2)  Tmaxj 1    2j1
Hence, in this case, the function is Lipschitz.
In all other cases, still assuming T1  T2, we have instead of an equality the





 2  0
and the result follows from the same reasoning.
Thus, the function is Lipschitz and hence continuous.
By now, we have proved that the scheme is continuous and therefore, using the
Brouwer xed point theorem we have existence of an equilibrium T.
Proposition 2.7 (Existence). The scheme that denes the actual T as a func-
tion of the anticipated T is continuous and has at least one xed point.
Hence, there is at least one equilibrium T.
182.2.3 Comments
This variant is a good example of a mean eld game in continuous time and
the mechanism will often be the same. First agents anticipate what will be the
dynamics of the community and hence anticipate m. Here, the relevant infor-
mation was captured by T that is a function of m so that they had to anticipate
m to anticipate T. From this anticipation agents use a backward reasoning
described by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Then, from this equation,
individual actions can be plugged into the forward equation (the Kolmogorov
equation) to know the actual dynamics of the community implied by individual
behaviors. Finally, the rational expectation hypothesis implies that there must
be coherence between the anticipated m and the actual m.
This forward/backward mechanism is the core of mean eld games theory in
continuous time and we will see it in action later on.
2.3 Mean eld games equilibrium as the N-player Nash
limit equilibrium
2.3.1 Introduction
Let us return for the sake of simplicity to our rst model. It is now time to come
back to the continuum hypothesis by considering the game with N players. To
simplify the account, and because it involves a \toy model", we look at the
same particular case as above (which is rather technical since the criterion is
not regular but is very graphic) in which the meeting begins once a proportion
 (we shall assume  = 90% for the sake of simplicity) of the participants have
arrived (but still we force T to be between times t and Tmax). In addition, let us
suppose that all the agents have the same . Various questions then naturally
arise:
 Does the N-player game have Nash equilibria?
 Is there uniqueness of such equilibria?
 Do N-player equilibria tend towards the mean eld games equilibrium
when N ! 1?
 If need be, is the rate of convergence known?
This case is simple, but it allows - since we shall answer the above questions in
the armative (in the symmetrical case) - to pave the way for an approximation
of an N-player game by MFG.
This example of approximation of a N-player game through a rst order ex-
pansion \G0 + 1
NG1 + :::", where (formally) G0 is the mean eld game and
G1 the rst order correction coecient, leads to a new type of solution of a
N-player game equilibrium. The solution of \G0 + 1
NG1" reects a strategic
19world in which agents do not care about other agents, individually at least, but
only about the population dynamics and a world in which N, the number of
players, is only entered to take into account the \granularity" of the game and
the imperfectness of the continuum hypothesis.
2.3.2 Solution to N-player games
To simplify, let us say that the number of players is N = 10k (k = 1;2;3;:::)
and thus that the meeting begins with the arrival of the 9kth player. A given
player (let us say player 1) will aim for an arrival time  which should verify
(symmetrical Nash equation):
 = argmin1E[C(1 + ~ 1; + ~ 2;:::; + ~ N)]
This function C does not really depend on all the components of (+~ 2;:::;+
~ N) but only on two statistics of order  + ~ (9k 1) and  + ~ (9k) where
one has noted ~ (r) the rth element, in the order, in f~ 2;:::;~ Ng. Indeed it is
obvious that the 90-percentile of (1 + ~ 1; + ~ 2;:::; + ~ N) is hidden
among 1 + ~ 1,  + ~ (9k 1) and  + ~ (9k).
Thus the Nash equilibrium is characterized by:
 = argmin1E[G(1 + ~ 1; + ~ y; + ~ z)]
where (~ y; ~ z) are statistics of order corresponding to the (9k   1)th and 9kth or-
dered elements of f~ 2;:::;~ Ng. Hence, the variables (~ y; ~ z) are independent of ~ 1.
Taking up the initial model, the function G is dened by:
8a;8b;8c  b; G(a;b;c) = G(a;t _ b ^ Tmax;t _ c ^ Tmax)
8b  c 2 [t;Tmax];G(a;b;c) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 (a   b) a  t
 (a   b) + (a   t) a 2 (t;b]
(a   t) a 2 (b;c]
(a   t) + (a   c) a > c
We have the following property:
Lemma 2.8. 8b;8c  b;a 7! G(a;b;c) is continuous, piecewise linear and con-
vex.
G is not practical for optimization purposes. Let's introduce H the function
(1;b;c) 7!
R 1
 1 G(1 + x;b;c)N 0(x)dx where N still is the cumulative distri-
bution function of a normal variable with variance 1.
20Lemma 2.9. 8b  c, H is a strictly convex function of 1 that decreases and
then increases.










































































































































This is strictly positive so that H is strictly convex as a function of the rst vari-
able. Since H(1;b;c) = E[G(1 + ~ 1;b;c)]  G(E[1 + ~ 1];b;c) = G(1;b;c),
H must be decreasing and then increasing.



















Let's now recall that we want to nd a symmetrical Nash equilibrium and the
condition is given by:
 = argmin1E[G(1 + ~ 1; + ~ y; + ~ z)]
Clearly this can be rewritten using the function H and we get:
 = argmin1E[H(1; + ~ y; + ~ z)]
Using the rst order condition associated to the preceding minimization we see
that we need to better understand the function @1H. The following lemma will
be helpful in what follows because it introduces compactness in the problem:
Lemma 2.10.
B = f1j9b  c;@1H(1;b;c) = 0g
is a bounded set.
Proof:
The set we introduced corresponds to the set of points at which H reaches
its minimum for all possible couples (b;c) with b  c. Because 8a;8b;8c 
b; G(a;b;c) = G(a;t _ b ^ Tmax;t _ c ^ Tmax), the same type of properties
applies for H and hence our set B is the same as
f1j9(b;c);t  b  c  Tmax;@1H(1;b;c) = 0g
Now, @1H(1;b;c) = 0 implicitly denes a function 1(b;c) that is continuous
and hence the set B is compact (and then bounded) as the image of a bounded
set (f(b;c);t  b  c  Tmaxg) by a continuous mapping.
Let's introduce now the best response function of agent 1. This function   is
dened as:
 () = argmin1E[H(1; + ~ y; + ~ z)]
Another (though implicit) denition of this function is based on the rst order
condition:
E[@1H( (); + ~ y; + ~ z)] = 0 ()
Lemma 2.11.
8;inf B   ()  supB
22Proof:
Since H is decreasing and then increasing as a function of the rst variable, we
clearly now that 8 < inf B:
E[@1H(; + ~ y; + ~ z)] < 0
Hence inf B   (). The other inequality is obtained using the same reason-
ing.
Since a Nash equilibrium simply is a xed point of  , we can restrict   to the
set K = [inf B;supB].
If we dene  jK :  2 K 7!  (), we see that any symmetrical Nash equilib-
rium must be a xed point of  jK.
Now we have our last lemma before the existence and uniqueness theorem that
says:
Lemma 2.12.  jK is a contraction mapping from K to K.
Proof:
Let's go back to the implicit denition of the function   given by (). Using the
implicit function theorem we have:
 0() =  
E[@2
12H( (); + ~ y; + ~ z) + @2
13H( (); + ~ y; + ~ z)]
E[@2
11H( (); + ~ y; + ~ z)]
Since 0 <  @2
12H   @2
13H < @2
11H, we have 0   0() < 1. Now because K is
compact, there exists a constant " > 0 so that 8 2 K; 0
jK()  1   .
Now using a classical xed point result we have:
Proposition 2.13 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists a unique symmet-
rical Nash equilibrium for the game with N players.
Remark: We restrict ourselves to cases where N = 10k and  = 90% for the
sake of simplicity but the preceding result is still true for all N and .
2.3.3 Approximation in 1=N
Before beginning the analysis, recall that the equilibrium is a Dirac measure in
the mean eld game case since all individuals have the same . We note this
equilibrium 
MFG, and the starting time for the meeting will be (except when a
limit is reached) 
MFG + F 1() where F is here the cumulative distribution
function of a normal distribution.
23Thus, rather than being dened by:
E[@1H(
N;
N + ~ y;
N + ~ z)] = 0




MFG + F 1()) = 0
We see that there is an advantage in introducing J dened by J(t;y;z) =
@1H(t;t + y;t + z) and that we can then carry out the following Taylor
expansion:
0 = EJ(








+E(~ y   F 1())@2J(
MFG;F 1();F 1())










E(~ z   F 1())2@33J(
MFG;F 1();F 1())





Detailed study of the properties of order statistics (see [17]), i.e. the variables
~ y and ~ z, show that the convergence of 
N toward 
MFG occurs in 1=N.
Indeed, if we write7
 = lim
N!1
NE(~ y   F 1()) 2 R
 = lim
N!1
NE(~ z   F 1()) 2 R
v = lim
N!1
NE(~ y   F 1())2
= lim
N!1
NE(~ z   F 1())2 = lim
N!1
NE(~ z   F 1())2 2 R
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The mean eld games framework is therefore an approximation of an N-player
game when N is large and we know the order of magnitude of the error occur-
ring when we consider a mean eld games model for solving an N-player game.
7The fact that these constants exist is not obvious and relies on the properties of order
statistics
243 A mean eld game applied to economics: pro-
duction of an exhaustible resource
A fairly typical example of mean eld game is that of the production of an
exhaustible resource by a continuum of producers. We know from Hotelling's
work (see [28]) that there is a rent involved in the production of an exhaustible
resource, but it is interesting to examine this in greater depth in a competitive
situation and to understand the dynamics of exhaustion of a scarce resource.
We therefore present a basic model onto which other models can be grafted.
For instance, the model can be improved to take account of a Stackelberg-type
competition, to consider the existence of big players (OPEC in the instance we
have in mind), etc. It is also a basis for studying important problems such as
the entry of new competitors, particularly those who are developing alternative
energy sources (see [20] for a complete analysis of this question in a mean eld
game framework identical to the one developed here. This framework allows for
instance to consider with powerful analytical tools the negative eect in terms
of carbon emissions of a subsidy to alternative energy producers (see [25]) as in
[18]).
This example will enable us to show the general character of mean eld games
PDEs when addressing Forward/Backward problems. It also oers a transpar-
ent way of dealing with externality.
3.1 Basis of the model
We consider a large number of oil producers, which can be viewed either as wells
or from a more macro standpoint as oil companies. The only assumption we
make is that there is a suciently large number of them and that one can apply
simple hypotheses such as that of the continuum (mean eld games modeling)
and perfect competition (price-taker behavior of agents).
Each of these oil producers initially has a reserve that is termed R0. We assume
that these reserves are distributed among producers according to an (initial)
distribution m(0;). These reserves will of course contribute to production q
such that, for any specic agent, we have dR(t) =  q(t)dt + R(t)dWt where
the brownian motion is specic to the agent considered.
Production choices will be made in order to optimize a prot criterion (the same






(p(t)q(t)   C(q(t)))e rtds s:t: q(t)  0;R(t)  0
where:





25 the prices p are determined according to the supply/demand equilibrium
on the market at each moment, demand being given by a function D(t;p)
at instant t (that could be written D(t;p) = Wetp  where Wet denotes
the total wealth aected by a constant growth rate to model economic
growth and where  is the elasticity of demand that can be interpreted in
a more general model as the elasticity of substitution between oil and any
other good) and supply is naturally given by the total oil production of
the agents.
Our model can be dealt with in the deterministic case or in the stochastic case
depending on the value of .
We are going to start with the deterministic case where  = 0. In that case,
a solution can be found without mean eld methods. The mean eld methods
will be necessary in the stochastic case and the economic equilibrium will ap-
pear as a very special case of the PDE system, leaving an empty room to add
externality eects and for more complex specications.
3.2 The deterministic case
3.2.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium in the deterministic case). The equilibrium is
characterized by the following equations where p, q and  are unknown functions












Let's consider the problem of an oil producer with an oil reserve equal to R0.











The rst order condition is:
p(s) = C0(q(s)) + ers
where ers is the Hotelling rent. Noteworthy, if one considered a monopole, the
price would not be \marginal cost + rent" but \marginal cost + rent" multi-
plied by the usual markup. In other words, the actual rent is increasing with
26the market power.
Now, using our specication for the costs, we get, as long as q(s) is positive:
p(s)      q(s) = ers




[p(s)      ers]+
In this equation  depends on the initial oil stock (or reserve) and it will be de-
noted (R0). This lagrangian multiplier is given by the intertemporal constraint








(p(s)      (R0)ers)+ ds = R0
Now, we need to nd the prices that were left unknown. This simply is given




If we compile all these results we get the 3 equations that characterize the equi-
librium.
3.2.2 Computation of an equilibrium
Since q only depends on () and p() we can totally separate the variables t and
R0. More precisely, if we consider an eductive algorithm (eductive algorithms
will be used later to solve coupled PDEs) we can consider two \guesses" ()
and p() to compute q(;) and then update () and p() using respectively the
constraints
R 1
0 q(s;R0)ds = R0 and D(s;p(s)) =
R
q(s;R0)m0(R0)dR0.
More precisely, we consider a dynamical system indexed by the variable  like
the following8












p(t;)      (R0;)ert
+
Once a dynamical system is chosen, the solution for R0 7! (R0) and t 7! p(t)
and hence the productions of all oil producers is obtained by:
8The system can be multiplied by the inverse of its Jacobian matrix. Dierent multiplying







As an example we can illustrate the evolution of total oil production in this
model where we consider a CES demand function, namely D(t;p) = Wetp .
We took the following values for the parameters: the interest rate considered
by oil producers is r = 5%, the average growth rate of the world economy is
 = 2%, the initial marginal cost of producing an oil barrel is  = 10,  = 100
to model the importance of capacity constraints,  = 1:2 because oil is not a
highly elastic good and W = 40 to obtain meaningful values in the model. The
problem is considered over 150 years and the initial distribution of reserves has
the following form:
Figure 1: m0
If we consider the global production of oil producers, its evolution is given by the
rst graph below where the horizontal axis represents the years and the vertical
one the global production at each date. The associated evolution of oil prices is
also represented where we only plot the rst 50 years to avoid ending up with
very large values after too many decades and hence a graph that is unreadable.
28Figure 2: Evolution of the total oil production
Figure 3: Evolution of prices over 50 years
293.2.3 Comments on the deterministic model
This deterministic model will appear as classical to most readers. Though, some
comments deserve to be made. First of all, we saw that prices were not equal
to marginal cost since the optimal production (when positive) is given by:
p(t) = C0(q(t;R0)) + (R0)ert
Hence, the Hotelling rent ((R0)ert) increases with time and diers among
producers. Since  measures the strength of the constraint associated to the
exhaustible nature of oil, it is a decreasing function of R0. As a consequence,
the rent is higher when it comes to consider a smaller producer.
Another remarkable phenomenon is the shape of the curve. Oil production rst
increases and then decreases. It's a form of the so-called Hubbert peak even
though we do not have the symmetry result associated to the usual Hubbert
peak9.
Economic growth pushes oil producers to produce more (and especially pro-
ducers with a large oil reserve) but the intrinsic exhaustibility of oil induces a
decrease in the production after a certain period of time.
3.3 The stochastic case
The above model was a mean eld game as any general equilibrium economic
model. In the simple deterministic case developed above, the mean eld games
tools didn't need to be used and classical tools were sucient, except perhaps
when it came to nd a numerical solution. However, when it comes to noise or
externality in the model, the mean eld games partial dierential equations will
be necessary. In contrast with the PDEs developed for the rst toy model, the
PDEs will now be completely coupled and not only coupled through boundary
conditions.
3.3.1 The mean eld games PDEs








s:t: dR(s) =  q(s)ds + R(s)dWs;R(t) = R








(p(t)q   C(q)   q@Ru(t;R)) = 0
9Our model not being suited for it since we do not focus on the discovery and exploitation
of new wells.
30Now, let's denote m(t;R) the distribution of oil reserves at time t. This distri-
bution is transported by the optimal production decisions of the agents q(t;R)
where, now, R is the reserve at time t and not the initial reserve as in the de-
terministic case.
The transport equation is:









Now, let's discuss the interdependence between u and m.
m is linked to u quite naturally since m is transported by the optimal decisions
of the agents determined by the optimal control in the HJB equation. This
optimal control is given by10:
q(t;R) =





Now, u depends on m through the price p(t) and this price can be seen as a
function of m. Indeed, because p(t) is xed so that supply and demand are









If we want to conclude on this part and rewrite the equations to focus on the















































These equations are the coupled equations associated to our optimization prob-
lem but it is still an interesting problem to establish a verication theorem that
would prove a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to be a solution
of the optimization problem.
10Once again we suppose that the solution of the (HJB) equation we consider is a solution
of the underlying optimization problem. Verication results still need to be proved.
313.3.2 Generalization and Externality
The equations, as stated above to focus on the interdependence, are less prac-
tical and intuitive than the preceding forms of the equation. Though, they
express something really important we want to insist upon: general equilibrium
in its classical form can appear as a very special case of a mean eld game. A
natural consequence is that we can add other eects in a very simple manner
while adding meaningful terms to the PDEs.
For example, it's widely thought amongst oil specialists that oil producers not
only want to maximize prot but also want to avoid being in the last producers
to produce because they do not know what is going to happen to oil companies
at the end of the oil era.
This kind of eect would have been very hard to introduce with the rst (usual)
approach we presented. With the mean eld games approach, the addition
of such an eect is just another dependence on m in the HJB equation that
denes u. One possibility is for example to introduce a ranking eect in the




























where H is a decreasing function. In addition to the intertemporal prot opti-
mization, the producer wants to have less oil reserve than its competitors.
This generalization is one amongst many. We just aim at convincing the reader
about the variety of eects and particularly externality eects the mean eld
games approach allows to handle quite easily. To see how this mean eld game
can be adapted to the study of competition between oil producers and potential
entrants that produce alternative energy, see [25] and [20].
4 Mexican wave
4.1 Introduction
Before moving on to more complex models, let us look at a \toy model" which
is prompted by mean eld games and models the mimicry responsible for the
Mexican wave phenomenon in stadiums.
Mexican wave is called this way because it seems that it appeared for the rst
time in a stadium in Mexico. The goal of our model here is to understand
32how a Mexican wave can be one of the solution of a mean eld game involving
a (innite) set of supporters and a taste for mimicry. Let's start with the
description of the stadium. To simplify the study, we regard our stadium as
a circle of length L (hence the stadium is a one-dimension object, though it
wouldn't be dicult to generalize). Mathematically, the stadium will then be
the interval [0;L) regarded as a torus.
In the stadium, there is a continuum of individuals; each one being referenced
by a coordinate x 2 [0;L). Each agent is free to behave and can be either
seated (z = 0) or standing (z = 1) or in an intermediate position z 2 (0;1).
Some positions are less comfortable than others and we model this phenomenon
using a utility function u.
Typically u will be of the following form to express that being standing or being
seated is more comfortable than being in an intermediate position:
u(z) =  Kz(1   z)
Now, let's describe the optimization function for any agent:
 An agent pays a price h(a)dt to change his position from z to z + adt.
h(a) will simply be a quadratic cost function: a
2
2 .













where g is a gaussian kernel.
 An agent maximizes his comfort described by u.








































dy + u0(z(t;x)) =  @2
ttz(t;x)





11This equation doesn't seem to be of the mean eld type but we can write the associated
mean eld equations.
Let's consider that agents are indexed by x. For each x, the Bellman function associated to
33Before going on and solve the problem, we must notice that z = 0 and z = 1
should be solutions of the problem. Consequently, we must have u0(0) = u0(1) =
0 and hence  and  have to be strictly greater than 1.
4.2 Mexican wave as a solution
A Mexican wave is, by denition, a wave. Hence we are going to look for a
solution of the form z(t;x) = (x   vt) where v is the speed of the wave. But
what we call Mexican wave is usually a specic form of wave and we want to
call Mexican wave a function  with a compact support on (0;L) that is rst
increasing from 0 to 1 and then decreasing form 1 to 0.
If we look for such a function , we can easily see that it must solve:
(1 + v2)00 =  u0()
Proposition 4.1 (Existence of Mexican waves for ; 2 (1;2)). Suppose that













there exists a Mexican wave  solution of (1 + v2)00 =  u0().
Proof:
We use an \energy method" to solve the equation (1 + v2)00 =  u0(). First,
let's multiply the equation by 0 and integrate. We get:
1 + v2
2
02 =  u() + C
Since  = 0 must be a solution, the constant has to be zero.
the problem of an agent in x can be written as J(x;) solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
0 = @tJ(x;t;z) +
1
2













where m(x;t;) is the probability distribution function of the position z of an agent situated
in x.
m(x;;) solves a Kolmogorov equation that is:
@tm(x;t;z) + div(@zJ(x;t;z)m(x;t;z)) = 0
with m(x;0;z) = z(0;x)(z) Hence, the problem can be written as a set of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations indexed by x with the associated Kolmogorov equations. Because the problem is
purely deterministic, we can directly follow the position of each individual and consider an
equation in z(t;x) instead of this complex system.




1 + v2=2(1   )=2
If  were greater than 2 the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem would apply using the
boundary condition (0) = 0 or (L) = 0 and the unique solution would be
z =  = 0. Now because we supposed  2 (1;2), we can have a local non-
uniqueness result.
Let's build a solution dierent from 0. First we can consider that  is equal to
zero in a neighborhood of 0 e.g. 8s 2 [0;]. Now for s > , we can integrate
the ODE and dene (s) implicitly by:
Z (s)
0
w =2(1   w) =2dw =
r
2K
1 + v2(s   )
This denition holds as long as (s)  1, i.e. as long as s  M where M is
dened as B(1 =2;1 =2) =
q
2K
1+v2(M ) (B stands for the beta function).
Now, for s > M, we build the solution in the same way and we can do so because
 2 (1;2). We dene implicitly (s) by:
Z 1
(s)
w =2(1   w) =2dw =
r
2K
1 + v2(s   M)





Now,  is supposed to be 0 for s  M0.
We have built a dierentiable function  but we need to check that M0 can be
smaller than L for a suciently small .
We have 2B(1   =2;1   =2) =
q
2K
1+v2(M0   ). Hence M0 can be smaller
than L if and only if there exists  such that




B(1   =2;1   =2)
Such a positive  exists if and only if
q
K
2(1+v2)L > B(1 =2;1 =2) and this
is equivalent to our condition thanks to the link between the functions   and
B.
We can represent a solution  as described above (supporters do not keep stand-
ing before going down to the seated position. This solution is not unique in gen-
eral for two reasons. The rst one is obvious:  in the preceding proof can be
chosen in an interval. However, this non-uniqueness is only due to a translation
35invariance of the problem on the torus and is therefore meaningless. A second
reason is that supporters may stand for a while before going back to the seated
position.
Figure 4:  =  = 1:5
4.3 Mean eld games versus descriptive models
All the models developed to represent the Mexican wave assume that the sup-
porters behave like automata: they carry out actions according to the context
with possibly some memory of the preceding moments. This logic of automatic
functioning is perfectly adequate for producing a Mexican wave-type crowd
movement, and even for producing an equation of the dynamics that is the
same as what we have written: if it has not already been done, we would be
able to do so.
The dierence between our model and a model based on automata agents (see
for instance [19]), lies in the meaning given to the agents' actions. While au-
tomata produce actions dictated by the context, our agents produce the same
actions as a consequence of a process of thinking about the behavior of other
agents, the coherence of these behaviors, and the personal preferences in view
of these behaviors. That this gives the same result as if agents were automata
should not be cause for disappointment: the parsimony principle does not apply
here; simply because agents behave as if they were automata is no reason for
not giving another meaning to their actions. And not only for ethical reasons.
Indeed, if one wishes to study the stability of the Mexican wave, and behaviors
apart from equilibrium, it becomes necessary to return to the mechanism that
has enabled the equation to be constructed. And hence, if the Mexican wave
has been disturbed, if some rows of spectators have not moved for an exogenous
reason, models based on automata generally predict erratic behavior in situa-
tions in which our mean eld games agents, after a moment's thought, behave
in such a way that the collective motion of the Mexican wave is re-established.
Thus the meaning given to behaviors sheds light on what one would expect in
36the event of disturbance to various processes.
5 A model of population distribution
5.1 Introduction
Let's now consider a model of population distribution. This model is the
archetype of a mean eld games model in continuous time with a continuous
state space. Many models can be derived from this one and most importantly
the notion of stability introduced in what follows is arguably one of the most
relevant one to deal with stability in forward/backward models such as intertem-
poral mean eld games models. This stability notion called eductive stability
turns out to be useful to circumvent the issues of the forward/backward struc-
ture, especially when it comes to nd numerical solutions to mean eld games
PDEs.
In what follows we only present some aspects of the model. The readers may
refer to [23] to go deeper into the dierent notions of stability or they may
read [22] for an even more complete presentation with generalization to multi-
population issues.
5.2 The framework
We consider a large number of agents modeled as usual by a continuum. These
agents have geographic, economic and social characteristics that we assume are
represented by a nite number n of values. A simple example is the position
of an agent represented by his coordinates in space. Another example is that
of a technology used by an agent. In short, we assume that the agents have
characteristics denoted by X 2 Rn.
Each individual will have control over his characteristics, and we choose the case
in which agents wish to resemble their peers. To resemble others, an agent has
to move in the state Rn. When an agent wants to make move of size  in the
characteristics space (hereafter social space or state space) he will pay a cost
of the quadratic form
jj
2
2 . Moreover, this control is not perfect, since we add



















t)dt + dW i
t
where m is the distribution of agents in the social space and where the function
g will model the will to resemblance depending on the type of problem. Various
specications for g will produce our results:







To simplify the exposition and to stick to the papers cited in the introduction,
we consider the logarithmic case where g is a local function of m.
The control problem is re-written in dierential way. We obtain the PDEs which







jruj2   u =  ln(m)




and in this case the optimal control is written (t;Xt) = ru(t;Xt).
What is fundamental in this PDE system is the forward/backward dimension.
The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation is backward like all Bellman equations
(in nite time, there would be a nal condition of type u(T;x) = uT(x)) { this
can also be seen in the diusion part of the equation, which is a backward heat
equation. Conversely, the transport equation is forward and transport an initial
distribution m(0;x) according to agents' optimal choices. We clearly see the
emergence of agents' reasoning in this forward/backward aspect. They assume
a dynamic for m and optimize as a result to get the optimal control ru. The
behavior we obtained transports the distribution of agents. The coherence is
nally found if we assume that the expectations are rational (and hence perfect)
on the distribution m. This is the usual reasoning in mean eld games.
5.3 Stationary solutions
We are interested rstly in stationary solutions. The framework of quadratic
costs and logarithmic utility allows us to have explicit quadratic solutions for u
and Gaussian solutions for m, as in the following result:
Proposition 5.1 (Gaussian solutions). Suppose that  < 2
2.
There exist three constants, s2 > 0,  > 0 and ! such that 8 2 Rn, if m is
the probability distribution function associated to a gaussian variable N(;s2In)
and u(x) =  jx   j2 + !, then (u;m) is a solution of our problem.
These three constants are given by:
 s2 = 
4
4 22















First, let's note that the stationary equation for m (the Kolmogorov equation)
can be rewritten as:









Consequently, we just need to solve the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation if
we replace m by K exp( 2
2u) where K is chosen to ensure that m is indeed a
probability distribution function.
We are looking for a solution for u of the form:
u(x) =  jx   j2 + !
If we put this form in the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation we get:





A rst condition for this to be true is:








A second condition, to nd !, is related to the fact that m is a probability
distribution function. This clearly requires  to be positive but this is guaranteed






























and this last equation gives !.
From this solution for u we can nd a solution for m. We indeed know that m
is a probability distribution function and that m is given by
m(x) = K exp(
2u(x)
2 )
39As a consequence, m is the probability distribution function of an n-dimensional






A priori, nothing guaranteed that a solution exists insofar as the cases usually
well treated (see [36]) correspond most often to a decreasing function g and
not, as here, to an increasing one. On the other hand nothing shows there is a
uniqueness result. First, there is invariance by translation and we must there-
fore localize the problem in order to address this question. This localization is
done simply by replacing ln(m(t;x)) by ln(m(t;x)) x2 ( > 0) and we obtain
the same type of results. Even when localized, we do not guarantee uniqueness
(though, localization will be helpful for other purposes). Although we do not
prove uniqueness, we are nevertheless interested in the problem of the stability
of solutions. Since we have a stationary result, a rst step towards studying the
dynamics is to study stability.
5.4 Stability results
5.4.1 Two notions of stability
Two types of stability are relevant to our problem. We will call the rst one
\physical stability" and the second one \eductive stability". The physical sta-
bility concept might look more standard to the reader. The second, the eductive
stability, refers to many papers by Roger Guesnerie and other authors (e.g. [26])
on stability in a rational expectation economic context. These papers inspired
the mean eld games eductive stability concept.
If we consider a problem on [0;T] with conditions equal to the stationary solu-
tions on each side (u(T;) = u and m(0;) = m given), we can look at what
happens (as T ! 1) when we disturb the boundary conditions (u;m). The
stability associated with this perturbation in 0 for m and in T for u is the phys-
ical stability and we refer to [23] for a complete study.
A second possibility is to add a variable  (vitual time) and to consider a dier-
ent, purely forward, dynamic system, whose stationary equilibrium is the same
as the one we are looking for. If there is convergence (when  ! 1) in this
new dynamic system where we reverse the time in the backward equation by
imposing arbitrary conditions in  = 0, then we shall call this eductive stability.
In what follows, we focus on eductive stability, and more precisely on local educ-
tive stability, because it helps a lot to develop and justify numerical methods.
5.4.2 Eductive stability
The physical stability, briey described above, is intrinsically linked to the for-
ward/backward structure of the equations.
40Here, we want to circumvent this forward/backward structure and we introduce
a virtual time  that will be purely forward in the sense that we consider the












Let's consider two \initial guesses" (u( = 0;x) and m( = 0;x)) that are not
too far from the stationary equilibrium (u;m) associated to  = 0, as dened
in Proposition 5.1:
m(0;x) = m(x)(1 + " (0;x))
u(0;x) = u(x) + "(0;x)
We are going to linearize these equations. After easy computations we obtain








 00   2x 0   00 +
x
s20
A more convenient way to write these linearized PDEs is to introduce the op-
erator L: f 7! Lf =  
2
2 f00 + 2xf0 and we get the following equations for the
couple (; ):
Proposition 5.2.
@ =  L    +  




It simply is a consequence of the link between the variables, namely s2 = 
2
4.
Now, we are going to use the properties of the operator L we have just intro-
duced. To do that we need to use some properties of the Hermite polynomials
associated to the space L2(m(x)dx) (see [1] for more details).
Proposition 5.3 (Hermite polynomials). We dene the nth Hermite polyno-
mial of L2(m(x)dx) by:










12We consider the problem in dimension 1 for the sake of simplicity but the problem in
general is the same
41The polynomials (Hn)n form an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space L2(m(x)dx).
The Hermite polynomials Hn are eigenvectors of L and:
LHn = 2nHn
To study the linearized equations, we are going to consider the space L2(m(x)dx)
and consider a decomposition on the Hermite polynomials basis. Because the
problem is purely forward in  we need to have, for each coordinate, two nega-
tive eigenvalues.
To this purpose, let's introduce the matrices (Bn)n:
Bn =





Lemma 5.4 (Eigenvalues of Bn). Let's consider n  2.
The eigenvalues 1
n < 2












Proposition 5.5. Let's suppose that the initial conditions (0;) and  (0;)
are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m(x)dx).















with n(0) equal to (0;)n =< Hn;n(0) > and  n(0) equal to  (0;)n =<
Hn; n(0) >.










8 > 0;8k 2 N;(nkn())n 2 l1( l2);(nk n())n 2 l1( l2)
Proof:




















an =  + 2n + 1
n; bn =  + 2n + 2
n
Now, to nd the two constants we need to use the conditions on n(0) and
 n(0):

n(0) = An + Bn



















n we can deduce the asymptotic


















These two estimations prove the results.
These estimations show that the solutions will be far more regular than the
initial conditions.
Proposition 5.6 (Resolution of the linearized PDEs). Suppose that:








x(0;x)m(x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)

R
x (0;x)m(x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)
Let's dene (n)n and ( n)n by:
 0() = 0(0)e  and  0() = 0.
 1() =  1() = 0.
 8n  2, n and  n dened as in the preceding proposition.
43Then (;x) =
P1
n=0 n()Hn(x) and  (;x) =
P1
n=0  n()Hn(x) are well
dened in H, are in C1(R
+), are solutions of the PDEs and verify the initial
conditions.
Proof:
First of all, the above proposition ensures that for  > 0 the two functions 
and   are well dened, in C1, and that we can dierentiate formally the ex-
pressions. Then, the rst three conditions can be translated as  0(0;) = 0,
1(0;) = 0 and  1(0;) = 0 and so the conditions at time 0 is veried.
The fact that the PDEs are veried is due to the denition of n and  n and
also to the fact that we can dierentiate under the sum sign because of the
estimates of the preceding proposition.
Proposition 5.7 (Local eductive stability). Suppose that:
 The initial guesses (0;) and  (0;) are in the Hilbert space H = L2(m(x)dx).

R




x(0;x)m(x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)

R
x (0;x)m(x)dx = 0 (this is guaranteed if the initial guess is even)
Then the solution (; ) of the PDEs converges in the sense that:
lim
!1
jj(;)jjL2(m(x)dx) = 0 lim
!1
jj (;)jjL2(m(x)dx) = 0
Proof:






j n()j2 !!+1 0
This is actually a pure consequence of the estimates proved earlier and of the
Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem.
These stability results are interesting but the symmetry conditions to obtain
them may seem cumbersome. Indeed, when it comes to apply this kind of
methodology to nd stationary solutions, we clearly need a result that is less
sensitive to initial conditions. A good way to proceed is to consider the case
introduced at the beginning where there is no translation invariance, that is the
localized case in which  > 0.
445.4.3 Eductive stability in the localized case
In the proof of the eductive stability, there was a need to impose symmetry
conditions on the initial guesses. These conditions were necessary to ensure
stability because B1 was singular. If one wants to have stability results for more
general initial guesses, the intuitive idea is to break the translation invariance
of the problem.
Interestingly, we introduced localization earlier. This localization idea can be
used once again, to have more general stability results. If we center the problem
around 0 as before, we can see that the only relevant dierence between the
original problem and the problem with an additional term  x2, that localizes








Now, in this context we can prove that the eigenvalues of Bn are both negative
for n  1 (remember that we needed n to be larger than 2 to have these prop-
erties in the case where  = 0).
This result can be used to prove general stability results when  > 0. It is
indeed straightforward that all our stability results can be rewritten exactly the
same if one replaces the conditions
 R
x (0;x)m(x)dx = 0 R
x(0;x)m(x)dx = 0
by  > 0.
Thus, in this localized context, (and up to a linear approximation) if we start
from a couple (u;m) close to a stationary equilibrium, there will be convergence
toward stationary equilibrium as  ! 1 when using the purely forward PDEs
system. Numerically, this is very interesting and the eductive methods give
very good results, both for nding stationary equilibrium and for generalizing
the approach for seeking dynamic equilibrium (see [23]).
5.5 Numerical methods
The forward/backward structure of mean eld games is quite an issue when
it comes to nd numerical solutions. One can try to nd a xed point (u;m)
solving alternatively the backward equation and the forward equation but there
is a priori no guarantee that a solution can be found in this way. The eductive
stability property proved earlier, however, can be adapted to design a numeri-
cal method. Other authors have developed several methods and the interested
author may for instance see [3].
We are going to present our methods to nd stationary solutions. Interestingly,
if one replaces the Laplace operator by heat operators (forward or backward,
45depending on the context), the numerical recipes presented below still work to
nd dynamical solutions (see [23, 22]).
5.5.1 Stationary equilibrium







jruj2   u =  g(x;m)




where, now, g is not anymore supposed to be the logarithm function.
The Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation can be simplied using the change of

























The two equations (HJB)' and (Kolmogorov)' can be written in a more practical
way for numerical resolutions by \inverting" the  operators. This can be done
in the Kolmogorov equation by restricting the Laplace operator to probability
distribution functions and we obtain:












This cannot be done in the case of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation but
we can invert an operator like 
2
2    Id for any  > 0. This gives:













Using these equations we can consider the ideas of eductive stability and try
to obtain solutions by solving the following equations where we introduce the
virtual time :









































Numerically these equations are quite easy to solve using Fourier series. An
example is shown below where g(x;m) =
p
m   x2 with 2 = 0:4,  = 0:4,
 = 0:5 on the domain [ 1;1] (we took  =

3).
Figure 5: Initial guess ' N(0;0:3). Solution after 8000 iterations with d ' 0:01
(an iteration is drawn every 40 iterations).
We see that after a certain number of steps in , the distribution m(;) con-
verges towards a limit distribution m that is a good candidate for being a
stationary equilibrium.
5.5.2 Generalizations
This method works really well in practice for stationary solutions. In addition to
be fast and eective, the eductive algorithm (as we term it) can be generalized
to nd not only stationary solutions but dynamical solutions of the mean eld
game PDEs. In short, the idea is simply to invert the heat operators instead of
Laplace operators before introducing the virtual time . This is done in [23, 22].
476 Asset managers and ranking eect
6.1 Introduction
When someone entrusts his saving to an asset manager, he does so according to
his risk prole, i.e. he will try and nd an asset manager whose management is
as close as possible, in terms of return/risk for example, to what would be his
own management strategy were it not delegated. However, the asset manager
to whom he entrusts his savings does not have the sole aim of satisfying his
current customers. He may wish to increase the number of his customers and
therefore the assets under management or, as an individual, perform better in
order to increase his bonus.
We oer a model which, starting o from the classic Markowitz model (see
[41]) or the CARA-Gaussian model, adds a ranking dimension among the asset
managers: each asset manager will want to optimize, over and above his usual
criterion, a function that depends on his ranking (in terms of return) among all
the asset managers.
6.2 The model
Our model therefore considers a continuum of asset managers who at time 0
have the same unitary amount to manage. These managers will invest in risk-
free and risky assets in creating their portfolio. A proportion  of their portfolio
will be invested in risky assets and a proportion 1    in risk-free assets with
return r. The risky assets have a return which we denote r + ~ , where ~  is a
random variable that we will assume is distributed normally, with the mean and
variance still be to specied.
To build their portfolio, managers will optimize a criterion of the following form:
E[u(X) +  ~ C]
where:
 u(x) =  exp( x) is a CARA utility function.
 X = 1 + r + ~  is the fund value at date 1.
  measures the relative importance of the additional criterion of compe-
tition among managers.
 ~ C is the random variable representing the ranking. This variable ~ C has
values in [0;1], with 0 corresponding to the worst performance and 1 to
the best performance obtained by a manager.
It now remains to specify how managers dier. If they all have the same amount
to invest, they nevertheless have dierent beliefs as regards the return on the
48risky asset, i.e. in relation to the variable ~ . These beliefs will concern the mean
of ~  (we assume that there is agreement on volatility), such that an agent will
be of type  if he thinks that ~   N(;2). We will assume in what follows that
the beliefs  are distributed according to a probability distribution function f
(even, for example).
6.3 Resolution
To solve this problem, let us consider an agent of type . The proportion  of his


























, N being the cumulative distribution function of a normal
variable N(0;1).
Proof:
The asset manager maximizes:
E
h
u(1 + r + ~ ) +  ~ C
i
It's easy to see that ~ C = 1~ >0M() + 1~ 0(1   M()) where M stands for the
cumulative distribution function of the weights .
Also,
E [u(1 + r + ~ )] =  E [exp( (1 + r + ~ ))]
=  exp






Hence, the optimal  is given by the argmax of:
 exp






+ E [1~ >0M() + 1~ 0(1   M())]















+E [1~ >0   1~ 0]m() = 0
49But,
P(~  > 0) P(~   0) = 2


















Hence we get the result.
If we now use the fact that the solution  7! () transport distribution f
toward distribution m, we see that the problem, once resolved, can be written
in a dierential way:
Proposition 6.2 (Dierential equation for  7! ()). Let's consider the func-
tion  7! () that gives the optimal  for each type. If  is C1 then it veries
















+f()C() = 0 ()
Moreover,  must verify (0) = 0.
Proof:
To go from the distribution f of the types to the distribution m of the 's, we
need a coherence equation that is simply:
m()0() = f()
Now, if we take the dierent rst order conditions FOC and multiply by 0()
we get the ODE we wanted to obtain.
Now, because C(0) = 0, the equation (FOC0) is simply
 22exp







and the unique solution of this equation is  = 0.
If we return to the Markowitz problem ( = 0), we see that the solution is
simply given by  7! 0() = 
2. Our problem with  > 0 is therefore written:
0() =
C()f()







This is not a usual Cauchy problem since the condition in 0 is meaningful only
at the limit. However, we should point out that the solution will be odd and
that we can therefore restrict ourselves to  > 0. Also, () must be increasing,
50which implies () > 0() and hence greater risk-taking in our model than in
the Markowitz model.
Now we can completely solve the problem and we get:
Proposition 6.3 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists a unique function
 that veries the equation () with the two additional constraints:
 () > 0() = 
2
 lim!0 () = 0
Proof:






If we want to invert this equation and get  as a function of z then we get:
() = 0() 
p
0()2 + 2z()
but since () > 0() we clearly can invert the equation and get:
() = 0() +
p
0()2 + 2z() := (;z())
Now, if we dierentiate the equation that denes z we have:
z0() = 0()()   0()0()  
1

















From Cauchy-Peano we know that there is a unique solution z of this equa-
tion that veries z(0) = 0. This solution is dened in a neighborhood V of 0.
From this we can prove that we can locally dene, in the neighborhood V ,  by
() = 0() +
p
0()2 + 2z(). This solution is unique because the dierential
equation that denes z has a unique solution for  > 0 (because of monotonic-
ity). Hence, since there is no problem outside of 0 (i.e. the Cauchy-Lipschitz
51theorem can be applied directly) the uniqueness is proved.
Now, we want to prove that there exists a solution on the whole domain. For
that let's consider the following ODE:
z0() =
C()f()





We know that there is a local solution z (dened on a neighborhood V of 0)
satisfying this equation with z(0) = 0.
If we dene loc on V (or more exactly on an open subset of V that contains 0,
because it is not a priori dened on V ) as:
loc() = 0() +
p
0()2 + 2z()
then, we have a local solution of the equation () that satises the two additional
conditions. Let's consider now ^  in V . We can apply the Cauchy Lipschitz
theorem to the equation () with the Cauchy condition (^ ) = loc(^ ) on the
domain f(;)= > 0; > 0()g and consider  the maximal solution of the
problem. This maximal solution clearly satises lim!0 () = 0. We want to
show that there is in fact no upper bound for the maximal domain.








We are going to show that these two cases are impossible.
Suppose rst that lim! () = +1. Then, we can suppose there exists an








































52This implies that we cannot have lim! () = +1.
Now, let's consider the remaining possibility that is lim! () = 0(). The
intuitive reason why this case is also impossible is that the slope when  crosses
the line associated to the solution 0 should be innite and this cannot happen.
To see that more precisely let's consider the following ODE:
0() =




Let's apply the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem to the above equation on the domain
(R+)2 with the Cauchy condition (0()) = . We have a local solution de-
ned on a small interval [0()   ;0() + ] and this solution exhibits a local
minimum at 0(). However, we can build another solution of the above Cauchy
problem since the inverse of the maximal solution  satises the equation and
can be prolonged to satisfy the Cauchy condition. Therefore, because of the
local minimum, the two solutions are dierent and this is absurd.
The conclusion is that the maximal interval has no upper bound.
Now, by symmetry the solution is dened on R.
One thing remains to be done. In fact, if we have found a function () that
veries the dierential equation and hence a distribution m coherent with the
rst order condition, we still need to check that the second order condition
is veried to be sure that we characterized a maximum of the optimization
criterion. This is the purpose of the following proposition:















Let's consider the unique function (), given by the preceding proposition, that




First, let's dierentiate the rst order condition  (;()) = 0 with respect to
. We get:
@ (;()) + 0()@ (;()) = 0
Thus, the sign of @ (;()) is the sign of  @ (;()) and we need to prove
















This expression is positive for  = () since ()  
2
6.4 Example
Now that existence and uniqueness have been proved, we can try to compute
numerically a solution. To know the shape of the curve, it's indeed important
to compute the function () for an example and to compare it to the linear
function 0() we usually obtain in the non-competitive case. This is what we
are doing now.
Let us consider the following case. We put r = 2%,  = 20% and  = 1. We
put s = 1% the standard deviation associated to f and we take  small. Nu-
merically, we obtain the following result:
The conclusion is that the introduction of the mean eld m overturns the
Markowitz model. The Markowitz model indeed supposes that each agent rea-
sons as if he were alone and that's not true in practice. Surprisingly perhaps,
even a small inuence of competition () completely changes the shape of the
solution and induces asset managers to take risker positions, both bullish and
bearish.
547 Mean eld games model of growth and Pareto
distribution of salaries
7.1 Introduction to the model mechanisms
We shall construct an economic growth model based on human capital using
the mean eld games approach. The idea is to consider a large number of peo-
ple who will endeavor to increase their human capital in order to increase their
salary. Increasing one's human capital usually has two eects: it leads to in-
creased competence and therefore salary, and also, ceteris paribus, a reduction
in the number of people one is in competition with and, as a result, an increased
salary. To take advantage of these two eects, there is obviously a cost. How-
ever, this cost is not the same for each individual since it is a priori easier for
someone with poor qualications to resort to training than for an agent whose
human capital is close to what economists call the technology frontier (see [2]).
We consider a large number of agents, each having human capital that we term q.
This human capital is distributed in the population according to a distribution
function we term m (the associated cumulative distribution function is F and
F = 1   F is the tail function).
Let us now dene the salary function. If we take a Cobb-Douglas production






m(t;q); if q is in the support of m(t;)
0 otherwise
If we suppose that m is a distribution function that decreases with q, we nd
the two eects mentioned above.












F(t;q); 8q in the support of m(t;)
Here, E is a constant that indicates the ineciency of the human capital produc-
tion mechanism and  and ' are two constants. This functional form means that
the cost depends on the growth intensity a of human capital (dqt = a(t;qt)dt)
but also on the proximity to the technological frontier, because of the tail func-
tion F.
The parameters , ,  and ' are positive and, to successfully do our calcu-
lations, we shall suppose that  +  = ',  =  and ' > 1, thus leaving two
14In general, if we consider two production factors x1 and x2, taking a Cobb-Douglas




2 . Hence if x1 is




7.2 The optimization problem and the associated PDEs
Let us now move on to the problem of optimization of agents. We assume that
they will maximize their wealth over time, which is coherent if one is situated
in a stylized world without liquidity constraint.








To solve this problem, we must rst specify the initial distribution of human





we see that the initial distribution of salaries is also a Pareto distribution, which
conforms to reality, at least for distribution tails. We therefore opt for this spec-
ication.
The optimization problem can be solved, since it is deterministic, by using the
classic Euler-Lagrange tools. However, as we shall later introduce uncertainty,
we prefer to solve it with mean eld games tools.





w(qs;m(s;qs))   H(a(s;qs);  F(s;qs))

e r(s t)ds
The mean eld games PDEs that concern J and m are then written in the
following form:
(HJB) w(q;m(t;q)) + @tJ + Maxa
 
a@qJ   H(a;  F(t;q))

  rJ = 0
(Kolmogorov) @tm(t;q) + @q(a(t;q)m(t;q)) = 0
where a(t;q) = ArgMaxa
 
a@qJ   H(a;  F(t;q))

is the optimal control.


































We can give explicit solutions1516:
Proposition 7.1 (Resolution of the PDEs). If '(' 1) < k, there is a unique
triple (J;m;) that satises both the PDEs and the additional equation on the
optimal control function: a(t;q) = q.




J(t;q) = B exp( kt)qk+'1qexp(t)






First of all, the additional condition is equivalent to a constant growth rate for
qt and therefore, we obtain the Pareto distribution m(t;) stated above.
Therefore, we have the following equation for @qJ(t;q) if q  exp(t):
@qJ(t;q) = E(q)' 1F(t;q)  = E(q)' 1e ktqk






























15There are some additional restrictions about the parameters for the integral in the criterion
to be dened at equilibrium (see [22])
16As always, this solution of the PDEs does not automatically induce a solution of the
control problem and a verication theorem still need to be written.
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Since '('   1) < k,  is unique.
Even though we cannot prove that there is uniqueness, this solution is very
interesting since  corresponds in fact to the rate of growth of human capital,
which is the same for everyone. Furthermore, we see that the solution m is
always Pareto-type, which is remarkable since in practice salary distribution
tails are indeed Pareto-type (see [7, 8, 48, 49] for more details on the analysis
of wealth distribution).
7.4 Underlying mechanisms
The fact that there is a regular growth path merits spending a few moments
on the underlying economic mechanism. To begin with, the basic reason why
people change their human capital is due to two eects. First, there is a pure
wage eect since, ceteris paribus, wage increases with human capital. However,
this eect cannot explain by itself the continuous improvement of human capital
at a constant growth rate. The eect needed to ensure a convincing explanation
is an escape competition eect17. A given individual taken at random in the
population is threaten by people who have less human capital than he has (say
~ q). Indeed, if part of those people were to improve there human capital so that
they end up with a human capital ~ q they would compete with our individual
on the labor market, reducing her wage. This eect is the origin of continuous
growth in our model. We have here a continuum of agents and therefore, for
any given individual, there is always a threat18. We think therefore that the
Schumpeterian eect which basically assumes that people will not improve their
human capital if the gains are too small is reduced to nothing because there is
always a potential competitor and that's why a Darwinian eect (competition
eect) dominates. Let's indeed highlight how tough is the threat eect. Each
agent knows that every one is threaten by every one, and that fear will induce
behaviors that will make the frightening event happen and be more important.
This model shows that the growth process is not only due to those who inno-
vate, that is to say \researchers" near the technological frontier, but is in fact
a process that involves the whole population and is fostered by those who are
far from the technological frontier and threaten the leaders by improving their
human capital. The process revealed is therefore very mean eld games, if we
can put it like that, since it brings into play an overall social dimension.
17see [6, 5, 4] for the link between growth and competition
18In practice everybody thinks there are people less gifted than he is...
587.5 A stochastic generalization
Let us now move on to a more stochastic model.
We suppose that dqt = a(t;qt)dt + qtdWt where W s a Brownian common to
all the agents. If therefore we put qm as the minimum human capital (this is in
fact a new state variable that evolves according to dqm
t = a(t;qm
t )dt + qm
t dWt
where a is here the optimal control ), we see that the Bellman function can be



















where a0 is nothing but a(t;qm
t ), exogenous in the optimization.








Lemma 7.2. If a(t;q) = q, then the probability distribution function of the








Assuming a(t;q) = q we get:
qt = q0 exp((  
2
2
)t + Wt) = q0qm
t
) m(t;q) = k
exp(k(   
2
2 )t + kWt)
qk+1 1qexp((  2





Proposition 7.3 (Resolution of the PDEs19). If '('   1) < k and r >

2
2 '('   1), then, there is a unique growth rate  compatible with the problem
and J is of the form:
J(q;qm) = Bqk+'(qm) k1qqm





Moreover,  is given by:
'('   1)   k
'






19For the \transversality" condition, see [22]
59Proof:
First, if a(t;q) = q then,
@qJ(t;q;qm) = E(q)' 1F(t;q)  = E' 1qk+' 1(qm
t ) k
From this we deduce that the solution is of the stated form with B = E
k+'' 1.
If we want to nd B or  we need to plug the expression for J in the Hamilton
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k
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As before, it is clear that, given our hypotheses, this equation has a unique
solution.
One consequence of these solutions is that growth is greater in the presence of
a risk factor, even though this risk is common to everyone. This conrms the
fact that growth is fostered by the fear to be overcome.
8 Mathematical perspectives
The examples above clearly show that many kinds of nonlinear problems arise
in the context of mean eld games models. For most of them, these nonlinear
problems are new systems of coupled nonlinear equations which, in the case the
state of the agents is described by continuous variables and the time variable
is continuous, are partial dierential equations. In all situations, the main nov-
elty of these systems is the mixed \forward-backward" nature of the equations
composing these systems. In general, no classical mathematical theory could be
involved to tackle them. Furthermore, in the \partial dierential" case for in-
stance, the scope of the necessary new mathematical theory is quite large since
many classical Partial Dierential Equations (such as Hamilton Jacobi Bellman
equations, Nonlinear heat or porous media equations, kinetic equations such
as Vlasov or Boltzmann equations, compressible Euler equations of Fluid Me-
chanics, general semilinear elliptic equations, Hartree equations in Quantum
60Mechanics, optimal transportation problems, ...) are in fact particular case of
mean eld games systems! This is to be expected since all these models arise
in Mechanics and Physics model in a \mean eld" fashion where the mean eld
sum up the collective or average behaviour of a large number of interacting
particles (which can be seen as agents without any possibility of choosing their
actions !)
Both the novelty of the mean eld games models and the \range" of problems
explain why numerous (and delicate) mathematical issues are being raised by
mean eld games theory.
To conclude, we set a brief (and thus far from exhaustive) list of issues for which
some mathematical understanding is available (although a lot of open questions
remain):
- Justication of the derivation of mean eld games models from
N-player Nash equilibria:
A general analytical framework has been developed by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L.
Lions ([34, 35, 36, 37] and [38]) that allows to derive rigorously the mean eld
games equations from N-player Nash equilibria. This framework is of indepen-
dent mathematical interest and has many other applications (limits of equations
when the dimension goes to innity, interacting particle systems, large devia-
tions for stochastic partial dierential equations, ...)
- Expansion in N as the number of players N goes to innity:
Such an expansion has been rigorously established for a large class of examples
of mean eld games models (at least in situations where the uniqueness of so-
lutions holds for the limit mean eld games system).
- Existence and regularity results:
For large classes of models, the existence and regularity of solutions is now un-
derstood.
- Uniqueness results:
Two uniqueness regimes have been identied: the case of a small horizon and
the case of a \monotone" coupling. In addition, non-uniqueness examples are
available that show that there does not seem to be any other general uniqueness
regime.
- Stability questions:
Of course, closely related to uniqueness is the issue of the stability of solutions
which is indeed, true in the uniqueness regimes. It is worth pointing out that
there are many notions of stability (small perturbations of data, horizon going
to innity, ...) which are all of interest.
- Interpretation of mean eld games models as control problems:
For a substantial class of mean eld games models, it is possible to show that
61the mean eld games system corresponds to a global optimal control problem
of a certain partial dierential equation. Roughly speaking, the system is then
described as the coupling of the equations governing the state of a system and
its dual state.
- Numerical Approaches:
Various numerical methods or approaches have been proposed such as direct
discretizations (nite elements) of the systems, discretization of the associated
control problem (when there is one, see above), various iteration strategies, or
the addition of an extra time variable (\relaxation time").
- Limiting situations:
One relevant class of limiting situations corresponds to what could be called
a planning problem. Instead of prescribing the initial state (\density") of the
agents population and the terminal \cost-reward" prole for each agent as it
is the case for \classical" mean eld games models, one prescribes the state of
the population (agents) both initially and at the end of the time interval (in
other words, at both ends). In that case, the unknown terminal \cost-reward"
function can be thought as the incentive scheme for each player which will lead
to the desired nal state of the population. Most of the preceding mathematical
results can now be extended to that \limiting" class of models.
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